Does the passenger of a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle following an allegedly unreasonably prolonged detention? Yes.
In a May 28, 2025, decision, State v. Pettit, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCC”) overturned a Twelfth Court of Appeals decision, ruling that a passenger of a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation has standing to challenge the search of the vehicle following an unreasonably prolonged detention.
The facts of the case are straightforward and basically uncontested. A Texas state trooper stopped a vehicle in Smith County for having an expired temporary tag, an inoperable brake light, and speeding on a rural country road. The vehicle was driven by Bridgett Tobler with Justin Pettit as a passenger. The trooper asked both vehicle occupants for identification. He then asked the driver to “exit the vehicle.” She immediately informed the trooper that her driver’s license had expired.
Two minutes into the stop, the trooper informed Tobler that he would issue a warning for the three violations that led to the traffic stop but that he would have to issue a ticket for driving with an expired license. The trooper then asked Pettit to exit the vehicle. He complied, but, according to the trooper, Pettit seemed “shaky” at the time. He quickly informed the trooper that he was on probation for “unauthorized use of a vehicle.” The trooper decided to pat him down, finding nothing.
Between six to seven minutes into the stop, the trooper advised both Tobler and Pettit that they had no outstanding warrants, after which he asked Tobler for consent to search the vehicle. She refused. The trooper walked back to his vehicle, at which time he admitted to his partner that he did not know “if they had enough for a dog” but added that both Tobler and Pettit had drug histories, both claimed not to know each other, Pettit was not from the area, and Pettit was “nervous.”
These factors prompted the trooper to seek and finally locate a K9 unit. He located the K9 search unit eight minutes after Tobler refused to give consent for the vehicle to be searched. It took the K9 unit another 56 minutes to arrive at the traffic stop. While conducting an “open-air” search, the K9 alerted, giving the trooper and his partner a reason to search the vehicle. The search discovered prescription medications, syringes, and a sawed-off shotgun.
Pettit was indicted for possession of a prohibited weapon. His attorney filed a motion to suppress the search evidence, specifically the prohibited weapon. After a hearing on the facts and circumstances surrounding the traffic stop, the search and seizure of evidence, and the legal arguments from the defense and prosecution, the trial judge took the matter under advisement. The judge subsequently issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which he found that the trooper did not have “reasonable suspicion” to detain Pettit while attempting to locate the K9 unit and secure its presence at the traffic stop.
The prosecution appealed the suppression ruling to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals. The prosecution primarily argued that Pettit, as a passenger, lacked standing to contest the search of a vehicle he did not own. Pettit, on the other hand, argued that he had a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in not being detained beyond the time it took the trooper to complete the traffic stop investigation (roughly 10 minutes) and that any further detention lacked reasonable suspicion.
The court of appeals ruled that Pettit lacked standing to challenge both the search and the admission of the evidence seized during the search because the trooper’s ability to search had not been affected by Pettit’s inability to leave the traffic stop.
The CCA confined its discretionary review of that decision to the single issue of whether Pettit, as a passenger, had standing to challenge his detention while the trooper awaited the K9 unit.
Rejecting the prosecution’s primary argument that Pettit did not have an expectation of privacy in either the vehicle or its contents, and the court of appeals endorsement of that argument, the CCA quite specifically said Pettit had standing and remanded the case back to the court of appeals because the court had failed to consider the “reasonable suspicion” issue necessary to justify Pettit’s “prolonged detention.” The CCA explained:
“ … Here, the search of the vehicle was the fruit of the poisonous tree of the unreasonably prolonged detention. Both the driver and passenger had a reasonable expectation in being from the intrusion of an unreasonably prolonged detention following the traffic stop. Trooper Wilkinson prolonged his detention of Appellee and Tobler to have a K-9 unit conduct an open-air sniff and, upon the dog’s alert, conducted a search of the vehicle. Absent reasonable suspicion, an officer may not extend a traffic stop in order to conduct a K-9 dog sniff. It follows that if Appellee had standing to contest the legality of the stop based on the intrusion into his reasonable expectation of privacy during a traffic stop, he has standing to challenge his prolonged detention following that stop.
“The question then becomes whether standing extends to the search of the vehicle in this case, which turns on whether the search of the vehicle was the result of the exploitation of Appellee’s continued detention. The answer to that question is yes … if a search constituted an exploitation of an illegal detention that search would be a ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’”
The CCA concluded:
“Here, the search occurred precisely because the trooper detained Appellee and the driver for nearly an hour to await a K-9 unit. Both Appellee and the driver were subject to the traffic stop and its attendant detention, which Appellee alleges was unreasonably prolonged in order to call for a K-9 unit. The search occurred because the trooper detained Appellee to call for the K-9 unit, which gave an alert authorizing the search. The search was the fruit of the detention. Also, the record reveals that Appellee was anything but irrelevant to the trooper’s decision to prolong the detention. Trooper Wilkinson testified at the suppression hearing that his decision to prolong the traffic stop was based on Appellee’s nervousness; that Appellee and the driver admitted to drug use; that Appellee and the driver offered unsolicited information; and that Appellee lied about his criminal history … Appellee’s presence was not irrelevant to the detention or the search that resulted from that detention. Because the facts gleaned during the prolonged detention gave rise to the justification for the search, Appellee has standing to challenge the search as a product of the prolonged detention.”
The CCA remanded the case back to the court of appeals to consider whether the prolonged detention was reasonable. Because the prolonged detention, which was long after the necessary duration for the traffic stop, and was without articulable suspicion of a crime, the 12th Court of Appeals should find the resulting search was illegal and the fruits of that search be suppressed.
